Techniques › T1070
T1070 Indicator Removal
stealth — Containers, ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1070
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.</p><p>Artifacts such as command histories, log entries, or file metadata may be altered in ways that align with expected user or system activity. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often platform-specific, allowing adversaries to tailor modifications that minimize suspicion.</p><p>These actions may not prevent detection entirely but can delay recognition of malicious activity or reduce the fidelity of alerts by making events appear benign or consistent with routine operations. Additionally, selectively removed or modified artifacts may still be recoverable through deeper forensic analysis, though their absence or alteration can complicate timeline reconstruction and attribution.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
| CVE | Vendor / product | Mapping type | State | Added |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-1389 | TP-Link Archer AX21 | secondary impact | Mapped | 2023-05-01 |
| CVE-2022-41128 | Microsoft Windows | secondary impact | Mapped | 2022-11-08 |
| CVE-2021-45382 | D-Link Multiple Routers | secondary impact | Mapped | 2022-04-04 |
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0184 Behavioral Detection of Indicator Removal Across Platforms v1.0
AN0520 WindowsMonitors sequences involving deletion/modification of logs, registry keys, scheduled tasks, or prefetch files following suspicious process activity or elevated access escalation.Tunable:
TimeWindowTargetFilePathPatternAN0521 LinuxDetects deletion or overwriting of bash history, syslog, audit logs, and .ssh metadata following privilege elevation or suspicious process spawning.Tunable:MonitoredPathsUserContextAN0522 macOSDetects clearing of unified logs, deletion of plist files tied to persistence, and manipulation of Terminal history after initial execution.Tunable:PlistTargetPathsExecutionChainDepthAN0523 ContainersMonitors tampering with audit logs, volumes, or mounted storage often used for side-channel logging (e.g., /var/log inside containers) post-compromise.Tunable:LogMountPathsContainerLabelScopeAN0524 ESXiTracks suspicious use of ESXi shell commands or PowerCLI to delete logs, rotate system files, or tamper with hostd/vpxa history.Tunable:LogSourceTypeLogPathPatternAN0525 Office SuiteDetects deletion or hiding of security-related mail rules, audit mailboxes, or calendar/log sync artifacts indicative of tampering post-intrusion.Tunable:TargetMailboxScopeAuditLogDepth
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1070
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-09-02 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0649be4a-aeb0-45b0-b89e-7f1668f6d9c0
Detects attempts to delete Internet Information Services (IIS) log files via command line utilities, which is a common defense evasion technique used by attackers to cover their tracks.
Threat actors often abuse vulnerabilities in web applications hosted on IIS servers to gain initial access and later delete IIS logs to evade detection.
Author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-10-19 (modified 2023-02-08) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_delete · 07bdd2f5-9c58-4f38-aec8-e101bb79ef8d
Detects the deletion of registry keys containing the MSTSC connection history
Author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-08-27 (modified 2023-01-23) · logsource: product=windows service=msexchange-management · 09570ae5-889e-43ea-aac0-0e1221fb3d95
Detects removal of an exported Exchange mailbox which could be to cover tracks from ProxyShell exploit
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-06-28 (modified 2022-11-25) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 115fdba9-f017-42e6-84cf-d5573bf2ddf8
Detects usage of powershell cmdlets to disable or remove ETW trace sessions
Author: Janantha Marasinghe
· 2022-12-13 (modified 2022-12-28) · logsource: product=aws service=cloudtrail · 20f754db-d025-4a8f-9d74-e0037e999a9a
Detects an instance of an SES identity being deleted via the "DeleteIdentity" event. This may be an indicator of an adversary removing the account that carried out suspicious or malicious activities
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-16 · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · 270185ff-5f50-4d6d-a27f-24c3b8c9fef8
Detects the deletion of tomcat WebServer logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
Author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping)
· 2024-03-26 · logsource: product=kubernetes category=application service=audit · 3132570d-cab2-4561-9ea6-1743644b2290
Detects when events are deleted in Kubernetes.
An adversary may delete Kubernetes events in an attempt to evade detection.
Author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-09-16 (modified 2023-02-15) · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · 3eb8c339-a765-48cc-a150-4364c04652bf
Detects the deletion of IIS WebServer access logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-13 (modified 2025-10-07) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 4931188c-178e-4ee7-a348-39e8a7a56821
Detect filter driver unloading activity via fltmc.exe
Author: Kirill Kiryanov, oscd.community
· 2019-10-23 (modified 2023-02-13) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 4d7cda18-1b12-4e52-b45c-d28653210df8
Detects possible Sysmon filter driver unloaded via fltmc.exe
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-15 · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · 63c779ba-f638-40a0-a593-ddd45e8b1ddc
Detects the deletion of the event log files which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
Author: Tuan Le (NCSGroup), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-03-09 · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · 95d61234-7f56-465c-6f2d-b562c6fedbc4
Detects linux package removal using builtin tools such as "yum", "apt", "apt-get" or "dpkg".
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-07-17 (modified 2023-09-18) · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · 9e9a9002-56c4-40fd-9eff-e4b09bfa5f6c
Detects when a system process (i.e. located in system32, syswow64, etc.) loads a DLL from a suspicious location or a location with permissive permissions such as "C:\Users\Public"
Author: @neu5ron, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
· 2019-03-22 (modified 2022-06-28) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6
Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-10-26 (modified 2022-12-30) · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · a55349d8-9588-4c5a-8e3b-1925fe2a4ffe
Detects the deletion of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
Author: Ecco, E.M. Anhaus, oscd.community
· 2019-09-26 (modified 2023-09-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · add64136-62e5-48ea-807e-88638d02df1e
Detects suspicious parameters of fsutil (deleting USN journal, configuring it with small size, etc).
Might be used by ransomwares during the attack (seen by NotPetya and others).
Author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
· 2021-11-25 (modified 2022-12-25) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7
Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Michael Haag, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
· 2019-10-22 (modified 2022-11-03) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c947b146-0abc-4c87-9c64-b17e9d7274a2
Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities
Author: @neu5ron
· 2019-02-07 (modified 2023-02-15) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c9fbe8e9-119d-40a6-9b59-dd58a5d84429
Detects potential malicious and unauthorized usage of bcdedit.exe
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-15 · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · ff301988-c231-4bd0-834c-ac9d73b86586
Detects the deletion of the PowerShell console History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence