Techniques › T1547 › T1547.001
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
persistence · privilege escalation — Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1547.001
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.</p><p>The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:</p>
- <li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code></li>
- <li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code></li>
- <li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code></li>
- <li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code></li>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
| CVE | Vendor / product | Mapping type | State | Added |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-22047 | Microsoft Windows | secondary impact | Mapped | 2022-07-12 |
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0365 Detect Registry and Startup Folder Persistence (Windows) v1.0
AN1032 WindowsCorrelation of Registry key creation/modification events under known Run/Startup keys with new or unusual binary paths or script-based payloads. Multi-event detection includes registry modification followed by process execution from non-standard directories or abnormal parent-child process relationships.WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core
New startup folder shortcut or binary placed in Startup directory→ DC0039 File CreationTunable:ImagePathRegistryKeyPathTimeWindowUserContext
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1547.001
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2018-08-25 (modified 2025-10-06) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 02ee49e2-e294-4d0f-9278-f5b3212fc588
Detects suspicious new RUN key element pointing to an executable in a suspicious folder
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 046218bd-e0d8-4113-a3c3-895a12b2b298
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 18f2065c-d36c-464a-a748-bcf909acb2e3
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
· 2023-12-01 · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 1c2a3268-3881-414a-80af-a5b313b14c0e
Detects the setting of a registry inside the "\Shell\Open\Command" value with PowerShell classes from the "System.Security.Cryptography" namespace.
The PowerShell namespace "System.Security.Cryptography" provides classes for on-the-fly encryption and decryption.
These can be used for example in decrypting malicious payload for defense evasion.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-03-05 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 20c3f09d-c53d-4e85-8b74-6aa50e2f1b61
Detects suspicious inline VBScript keywords as used by UNC2452
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2025-10-22) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 20f0ee37-5942-4e45-b7d5-c5b5db9df5cd
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2026-01-05) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 24357373-078f-44ed-9ac4-6d334a668a11
Detects direct modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry using reg.exe.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-08-10 (modified 2025-10-12) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e
Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors.
These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
· 2020-05-02 (modified 2025-12-03) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75
A General detection for files being created in the Windows startup directory. This could be an indicator of persistence.
Author: Vadim Varganov, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-08-24 (modified 2023-02-23) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 318557a5-150c-4c8d-b70e-a9910e199857
Detects msdt.exe creating files in suspicious directories which could be a sign of exploitation of either Follina or Dogwalk vulnerabilities
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-03-05 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 46490193-1b22-4c29-bdd6-5bf63907216f
Detects VBScript content stored into registry keys as seen being used by UNC2452 group
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2025-10-22) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 480421f9-417f-4d3b-9552-fd2728443ec8
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2024-04-23 · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 5cdeb555-65de-4767-99fe-e26807465148
Detects the setting of a custom protocol handler with the name "rogue".
Seen being created by Forest Blizzard APT as reported by MSFT.
Author: Aidan Bracher
· 2020-07-07 (modified 2023-09-19) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_event · 70d43542-cd2d-483c-8f30-f16b436fd7db
Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-07-16 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 74a2b37d-fea4-41e0-9ac7-c9fbcf1f60cc
Detects WinRAR creating files in Windows startup locations, which may indicate an attempt to establish persistence by adding malicious files to the Startup folder.
This kind of behaviour has been associated with exploitation of WinRAR path traversal vulnerability CVE-2025-6218 or CVE-2025-8088.
Author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-03-17 (modified 2025-07-18) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 8d85cf08-bf97-4260-ba49-986a2a65129c
Detects potential PowerShell commands or code within registry run keys
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2026-01-05 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 8f3ab69a-aa22-4943-aa58-e0a52fdf6818
Detects modifications to User Shell Folders registry values via reg.exe or PowerShell, which could indicate persistence attempts.
Attackers may modify User Shell Folders registry values to point to malicious executables or scripts that will be executed during startup.
This technique is often used to maintain persistence on a compromised system by ensuring that malicious payloads are executed automatically.
Author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE
· 2021-10-24 (modified 2023-02-23) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 92fa78e7-4d39-45f1-91a3-8b23f3f1088d
Detects PowerShell writing startup shortcuts.
This procedure was highlighted in Red Canary Intel Insights Oct. 2021, "We frequently observe adversaries using PowerShell to write malicious .lnk files into the startup directory to establish persistence.
Accordingly, this detection opportunity is likely to identify persistence mechanisms in multiple threats.
In the context of Yellow Cockatoo, this persistence mechanism eventually launches the command-line script that leads to the installation of a malicious DLL"
Author: frack113, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-10-01 (modified 2026-01-05) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 9c226817-8dc9-46c2-a58d-66655aafd7dc
Detect modification of the User Shell Folders registry values for Startup or Common Startup which could indicate persistence attempts.
Attackers may modify User Shell Folders registry keys to point to malicious executables or scripts that will be executed during startup.
This technique is often used to maintain persistence on a compromised system by ensuring that the malicious payload is executed automatically.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poude (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-10-01 (modified 2025-02-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_event · 9c5037d1-c568-49b3-88c7-9846a5bdc2be
Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2025-10-22) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 9df5f547-c86a-433e-b533-f2794357e242
Detects modification of Windows Registry Classes keys used for persistence.
Adversaries modify these autostart extensibility points (ASEP) to execute malicious code when file types are opened or actions are performed.
Various legitimate software also uses these keys. Currently, this rule only filters out known legitimate software paths,
thus it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production.
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · a80f662f-022f-4429-9b8c-b1a41aaa6688
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2025-12-08) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · b29aed60-ebd1-442b-9cb5-16a1d0324adb
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community
· 2018-07-18 (modified 2023-12-11) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · b7916c2a-fa2f-4795-9477-32b731f70f11
Detects a possible persistence mechanism using RUN key for Windows Explorer and pointing to a suspicious folder
Author: X__Junior
· 2025-01-16 (modified 2025-08-16) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2026-01-09) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · baecf8fb-edbf-429f-9ade-31fc3f22b970
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Adversaries may modify these keys to execute malicious code when Office files are opened.
There are various legitimate add-ins that also use these keys and this filter list might not be exhaustive.
Thus, it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
· 2024-07-03 · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · c0c67b21-eb8a-4c84-a395-40473ec3b482
Detects the setting of a new value in the Autorun key that is used by the Kapeka backdoor for persistence.
Author: Janantha Marasinghe
· 2022-11-18 (modified 2022-12-30) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c2c76b77-32be-4d1f-82c9-7e544bdfe0eb
Detects potential suspicious behaviour using secedit.exe. Such as exporting or modifying the security policy
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Vasiliy Burov, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-12-16 (modified 2023-02-03) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c37510b8-2107-4b78-aa32-72f251e7a844
Detects Ryuk ransomware activity
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-02-17 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0
Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior
· 2024-03-22 · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · c9b86500-1ec2-4de6-9120-d744c8fb5caf
Detects changes to the "Winlogon" registry key where a process will set the value of the "Shell" to a value that was observed being used by KamiKakaBot samples in order to achieve persistence.
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2025-10-22) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · cbf93e5d-ca6c-4722-8bea-e9119007c248
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · d6c2ce7e-afb5-4337-9ca4-4b5254ed0565
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2024-04-23 · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · d807056b-0e00-4cec-b7f8-b8b7518e382b
Detects the setting of the DLL that handles the custom protocol handler.
Seen being created by Forest Blizzard APT as reported by MSFT.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-06-28 (modified 2025-02-17) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · de587dce-915e-4218-aac4-835ca6af6f70
Detects suspicious command line reg.exe tool adding key to RUN key in Registry
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · e7a2fd40-3ae1-4a85-bf80-15cf624fb1b1
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split), wagga (name)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2025-10-22) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · f59c3faf-50f3-464b-9f4c-1b67ab512d99
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2022-03-26) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_event · f663a6d9-9d1b-49b8-b2b1-0637914d199a
Detects abusing Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
· 2019-10-25 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · f674e36a-4b91-431e-8aef-f8a96c2aca35
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Rules tagged at the parent level (attack.t1547) 7
These target the parent technique, not this sub-technique specifically. Listed for completeness, not counted as coverage.
Author: Elastic, Josh Nickels, Marius Rothenbücher
· 2024-09-06 · logsource: product=windows service=security · 123e4e6d-b123-48f8-b261-7214938acaf0
Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects.
Author: frack113
· 2021-11-18 (modified 2022-12-06) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_event · 277efb8f-60be-4f10-b4d3-037802f37167
Detects persistence registry keys for Recycle Bin
Author: Mateusz Wydra, oscd.community
· 2020-10-13 (modified 2023-01-19) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_event · 9577edbb-851f-4243-8c91-1d5b50c1a39b
Detects creation/modification of Assistive Technology applications and persistence with usage of 'at'
Author: Hai Vaknin @LuxNoBulIshit, Avihay eldad @aloneliassaf, Austin Songer @austinsonger
· 2021-09-30 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · a2ea3ae7-d3d0-40a0-a55c-25a45c87cac1
Detects when a possible suspicious driver is being installed via pnputil.exe lolbin
Author: Greg (rule)
· 2022-07-21 (modified 2023-01-05) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · a6976974-ea6f-4e97-818e-ea08625c52cb
Detects a phishing attack which expands a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut.
If the victim expands the ZIP file via the explorer process, then the explorer process expands the malicious ZIP file and drops a malicious shortcut redirected to a backdoor into the Startup folder.
Additionally, the file name of the malicious shortcut in Startup folder contains {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} meaning the folder shortcut operation.
Author: omkar72
· 2020-10-30 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_event · b98968aa-dbc0-4a9c-ac35-108363cbf8d5
Detects potential malicious modification of run keys by winekey or team9 backdoor
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-05-19 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · f14e169e-9978-4c69-acb3-1cff8200bc36
Detects the suspicious execution of a utility to convert Windows 3.x .grp files or for persistence purposes by malicious software or actors