Coverage › CVE-2010-2883
CVE-2010-2883 Mapped Sigma
Adobe Acrobat and Reader Stack-Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
- Vendor / product
- Adobe — Acrobat and Reader
- Description (CISA)
- Adobe Acrobat and Reader contain a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability that allows remote attackers to execute code or cause denial-of-service (DoS).
- Added to KEV
- 2022-06-08
- Due date
- 2022-06-22
- Required action
- Apply updates per vendor instructions.
- Known ransomware use
- Unknown
- CWE
- CWE-119
- CISA notes
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-2883
- Elsewhere
- cve.org · NVD · CISA KEV · JSON
ATT&CK techniques · CTID Mappings Explorer, ATT&CK 16.1, KEV snapshot 2025-07-28
3 mapping objects across 3 techniques. exploitation technique states how the vulnerability is exploited; primary and secondary impact state what exploitation achieves. They are different claims and are labelled as such.
| Technique | Mapping type | CTID comment | Status in v19.2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1204.002 Malicious File | exploitation technique | This vulnerability is exploited by the user opening a malicious pdf file to achieve arbitrary code execution. ref 1 |
live |
| T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information | primary impact | This vulnerability is exploited by the user opening a malicious pdf file to achieve arbitrary code execution. ref 1 |
live |
| T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter | secondary impact | This vulnerability is exploited by the user opening a malicious pdf file to achieve arbitrary code execution. ref 1 |
live |
Detection chain · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2 detection strategies, analytics, log sources
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information primary impact
- DET0378 Behavioral Detection of Obfuscated Files or Information
AN1064 WindowsCorrelates script execution or suspicious parent processes with creation or modification of encoded, compressed, or encrypted file formats (e.g., .zip, .7z, .enc) and abnormal command-line syntax or PowerShell obfuscation.Tunable:
PayloadEntropyThresholdTimeWindowSuspiciousParentProcessListAN1065 LinuxDetects use of gzip, base64, tar, or openssl in scripts or commands that encode/encrypt files after file staging or system enumeration.Tunable:CommandRegexSensitivePathListAN1066 macOSMonitors use of archive or encryption tools (zip, openssl) tied to user-scripted activity or binaries writing encoded payloads under /Users or /Volumes.macos:unifiedloglog stream --predicate 'processImagePath contains "zip" OR "base64"'→ DC0064 Command ExecutionTunable:FilenameExtensionListUserContextAN1067 Network DevicesIdentifies transfer of base64, uuencoded, or high-entropy files over HTTP, FTP, or custom protocols in lateral movement or exfiltration streams.Tunable:EntropyThresholdProtocolScopeAN1068 ESXiDetects encoded PowerCLI or Base64-encoded payloads staged via datastore uploads or shell access (e.g., ESXi Shell or backdoored VIBs).Tunable:StagingLocationEncodedLengthThreshold
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1027 (94)
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-05-09 · logsource: product=windows service=security · 00ba9da1-b510-4f6b-b258-8d338836180f
Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
Author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
· 2020-10-08 (modified 2023-01-04) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_module · 07ad2ea8-6a55-4ac6-bf3e-91b8e59676eb
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
· 2020-10-15 (modified 2024-04-05) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 0adfbc14-0ed1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
Author: frack113
· 2022-04-23 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 0c3fac91-5627-46e8-a6a8-a0d7b9b8ae1b
Get-Variable is a valid PowerShell cmdlet
WindowsApps is by default in the path where PowerShell is executed.
So when the Get-Variable command is issued on PowerShell execution, the system first looks for the Get-Variable executable in the path and executes the malicious binary instead of looking for the PowerShell cmdlet.
Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
· 2020-10-15 (modified 2022-11-29) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974
Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
Author: Micah Babinski
· 2022-12-11 (modified 2023-03-05) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0c92f2e6-f08f-4b73-9216-ecb0ca634689
Detects the use of rcedit to potentially alter executable PE metadata properties, which could conceal efforts to rename system utilities for defense evasion.
Author: @kostastsale
· 2025-11-22 · logsource: product=linux category=file_event · 11629c4d-0fe6-465b-be62-b39a1c442aad
Detects the creation of files with unusually long filenames (100 or more characters), which may indicate obfuscation techniques used by malware such as VShell.
This is a hunting rule to identify potential threats that use long filenames to evade detection. Keep in mind that on a legitimate system, such long filenames can and are common. Run this detection in the context of threat hunting rather than alerting.
Adjust the threshold of filename length as needed based on your environment.
Author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
· 2020-10-18 (modified 2022-11-29) · logsource: product=windows service=system · 11b52f18-aaec-4d60-9143-5dd8cc4706b9
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
Author: Alexander Rausch
· 2020-06-24 (modified 2023-01-05) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 130c9e58-28ac-4f83-8574-0a4cc913b97e
Detects files dropped by Winnti as described in RedMimicry Winnti playbook
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-15 (modified 2025-12-01) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 13e6fe51-d478-4c7e-b0f2-6da9b400a829
Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from direct IPs.
Author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
· 2020-10-13 (modified 2022-11-29) · logsource: product=windows service=system · 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
Author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
· 2020-10-18 (modified 2022-11-29) · logsource: product=windows service=system · 175997c5-803c-4b08-8bb0-70b099f47595
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
Author: @kostastsale
· 2025-11-22 · logsource: product=linux category=file_event · 179b3686-6271-4d87-807d-17d843a8af73
Detects files with specially crafted filenames that embed Base64-encoded bash payloads designed to execute when processed by shell scripts.
These filenames exploit shell interpretation quirks to trigger hidden commands, a technique observed in VShell malware campaigns.
Author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-01-30 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1816994b-42e1-4fb1-afd2-134d88184f71
Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-15 (modified 2025-12-01) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 19b08b1c-861d-4e75-a1ef-ea0c1baf202b
Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files.
All 94 rules on the technique page →
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter secondary impact
- DET0516 Behavioral Detection of Command and Scripting Interpreter Abuse
AN1428 WindowsDetects the execution of scripting or command interpreters (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe) outside expected administrative time windows or from abnormal user contexts, often followed by encoded/obfuscated arguments or secondary execution events.Tunable:
CommandLinePatternParentProcessNameTimeWindowAN1429 LinuxDetects use of shell interpreters (e.g., bash, sh, python, perl) initiated by users or processes not normally executing them, especially when chaining suspicious utilities like netcat, curl, or ssh.Tunable:InterpreterNameUserContextExecutionChainLengthAN1430 macOSDetects launch of command-line interpreters via Terminal, Automator, or hiddenosascript, especially when parent process lineage deviates from user-initiated applications.macos:unifiedloglog stream --info --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "exec"'→ DC0032 Process CreationTunable:LaunchAgentNameScriptNameTerminalAppUsageAN1431 ESXiDetects use of 'esxcli system' or direct interpreter commands (e.g., busybox shell) invoked from SSH or host terminal unexpectedly.Tunable:ShellEnabledFlagSSHContextAN1432 Network DevicesIdentifies CLI interpreter access (e.g., Cisco IOS, Juniper JUNOS) viaenablemode or scripting-capable sessions used by uncommon accounts or from unknown IPs.Tunable:UserRoleDeviceType
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1059 (95)
Author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
· 2023-04-05 · logsource: product=macos category=process_creation · 0250638a-2b28-4541-86fc-ea4c558fa0c6
Detects suspicious child processes spawned from browsers. This could be a result of a potential web browser exploitation.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-04-17 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 05ebafc8-7aa2-4bcd-a269-2aec93f9e842
Detects usage of winget to add new additional download sources
Author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community
· 2020-10-09 (modified 2024-04-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 06b401f4-107c-4ff9-947f-9ec1e7649f1e
Detects execution of "ftp.exe" script with the "-s" or "/s" flag and any child processes ran by "ftp.exe".
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community
· 2022-06-14 (modified 2023-01-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0955e4e1-c281-4fb9-9ee1-5ee7b4b754d2
Detects execition of commands and binaries from the context of The program compatibility assistant (Pcalua.exe). This can be used as a LOLBIN in order to bypass application whitelisting.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-11-25 · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · 11bb9b26-4179-4a06-afcb-1ec31fce1627
Detects potential Shai-Hulud malware indicators based on specific command line arguments associated with its execution.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-02-08 (modified 2026-02-17) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1228c958-e64e-4e71-92ad-7d429f4138ba
Detects suspicious script execution from suspicious directories or folders accessible by environment variables that may indicate malware activity.
Script interpreters (cscript, wscript, mshta, powershell) executing from folders like Temp, Public, or user profile directories may suggest attempts to evade detection or execute malicious scripts.
Author: Josh Nickels, Marius Rothenbücher
· 2024-09-06 · logsource: product=windows category=dns_query · 12310575-e8b1-475c-a976-57ed540b349c
Detects unusual domain resolutions originating from CScript/WScript that can identify malicious javascript files executing in an environment, often as a result from a phishing or watering hole attack.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-11-20 (modified 2023-03-29) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
Author: frack113, Tim Shelton (update fp)
· 2022-12-05 (modified 2025-03-06) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 178e615d-e666-498b-9630-9ed363038101
Detects when a shell program such as the Windows command prompt or PowerShell is launched with system privileges from a uncommon parent location.
Author: Micah Babinski
· 2023-10-15 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 1a433e1d-03d2-47a6-8063-ece992cf4e73
Detects the usage of curl.exe, KeyScramblerLogon, or other non-standard/suspicious processes used to create Autoit3.exe.
This activity has been associated with DarkGate malware, which uses Autoit3.exe to execute shellcode that performs
process injection and connects to the DarkGate command-and-control server. Curl, KeyScramblerLogon, and these other
processes consitute non-standard and suspicious ways to retrieve the Autoit3 executable.
Author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
· 2023-11-14 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1ddaa9a4-eb0b-4398-a9fe-7b018f9e23db
Detects exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-22518 (Confluence Data Center / Confluence Server), where an attacker can exploit vulnerable endpoints to e.g. create admin accounts and execute arbitrary commands.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-01-02 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 20a5ffa1-3848-4584-b6f8-c7c7fd9f69c8
Detects execution of ruby using the "-e" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live ruby code.
Author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)
· 2022-10-17 · logsource: product=macos category=process_creation · 234dc5df-40b5-49d1-bf53-0d44ce778eca
Detects when a built-in utility is used to decode and decrypt a payload after a macOS disk image (DMG) is executed. Malware authors may attempt to evade detection and trick users into executing malicious code by encoding and encrypting their payload and placing it in a disk image file. This behavior is consistent with adware or malware families such as Bundlore and Shlayer.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-06-14 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 236d8e89-ed95-4789-a982-36f4643738ba
Detects execution of the "VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" with the "script" and "set" flag to setup a specific script that's located in a potentially suspicious location to run for a specific VM state
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
· 2024-01-11 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 2433a154-bb3d-42e4-86c3-a26bdac91c45
Detects the execution of a renamed "PingCastle" binary based on the PE metadata fields.
All 95 rules on the technique page →
T1204.002 Malicious File exploitation technique
- DET0294 User Execution – Malicious File via download/open → spawn chain (T1204.002)
AN0819 WindowsUser opens a file delivered by email, web, chat, or share. The handler application (Word/PDF reader/archiver) creates a file in user-controlled paths (Downloads, Temp, Desktop) and then spawns a new or unusual child process (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cmd.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, msiexec.exe). Optional precursors include FileStreamCreated (URL/UNC) and Office → system32 batch writes.Tunable:
TimeWindowSuspiciousExtensionsUserPathsParentAppsSignerAllowListAN0820 macOSUser opens a downloaded document/installer leading to EndpointSecurity file create in ~/Downloads or ~/Library paths then an exec of a suspicious utility (osascript, bash/zsh, curl, chmod, open with -a Terminal). Correlates File Creation with subsequent process exec and, optionally, quarantine/LSQuarantine events.macos:unifiedlogprocess_exec: image in {/bin/bash,/bin/zsh,/usr/bin/osascript,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/open} AND parent in {Preview, TextEdit, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, AdobeReader, Archive Utility, Finder}→ DC0032 Process Creationmacos:endpointsecurityES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CREATE: path under /Users/*/(Downloads|Desktop|Library/*/Containers|Library/Group Containers) AND extension in SuspiciousExtensions→ DC0039 File CreationTunable:TimeWindowQuarantineRequiredParentAppsAN0821 LinuxUser or desktop application writes a new file to ~/Downloads, /tmp, or mounted removable media followed by execve of a risky interpreter/loader (bash, sh, python, perl, php, node, curl|wget piping to sh, ld.so, rdesktop, xdg-open - with unusual args). Uses auditd PATH+SYSCALL (open/creat/write/rename) with execve event linking.auditd:SYSCALLopen/create/rename: name in (/home/*/Downloads/*|/tmp/*|/run/user/*|/media/*) AND ext in SuspiciousExtensions→ DC0039 File Creationauditd:SYSCALLexecve: exe in {/bin/bash,/bin/sh,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/perl,/usr/bin/php,/usr/bin/node,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/wget,/usr/bin/xdg-open,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/rundll32 (wine)} AND ppid process is a document viewer/browser→ DC0032 Process CreationTunable:TimeWindowDesktopParentMap
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1204.002 (39)
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-11-07 (modified 2023-05-18) · logsource: category=proxy · 00d0b5ab-1f55-4120-8e83-487c0a7baf19
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
Author: Joseph Kamau
· 2024-05-27 (modified 2025-10-07) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1193d960-2369-499f-a158-7b50a31df682
Detects when a browser process or browser tab is launched from an application that handles document files such as Adobe, Microsoft Office, etc. And connects to a web application over http(s), this could indicate a possible phishing attempt.
Author: Steffen Rogge (dr0pd34d)
· 2024-07-10 · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · 1337afba-d17d-4d23-bd55-29b927603b30
Detects Microsoft Word loading an Add-In (.wll) file which can be used by threat actors for initial access or persistence.
Author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team
· 2022-02-28 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-08-10 (modified 2025-10-12) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e
Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors.
These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
Author: Michael Haag, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-11-03 · logsource: product=windows service=appxdeployment-server · 289dfa9e-e378-4a56-a9d4-7ed5ee218029
Detects successful MSIX/AppX package installations on Windows systems by monitoring EventID 854 in the Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeployment-Server/Operational log.
While most installations are legitimate, this can help identify unauthorized or suspicious package installations.
It is crucial to monitor such events as threat actors may exploit MSIX/AppX packages to deliver and execute malicious payloads.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2020-05-08 (modified 2023-02-13) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 29fd07fc-9cfd-4331-b7fd-cc18dfa21052
Detects specific process characteristics of Maze ransomware word document droppers
Author: Leonardo Gasparini
· 2026-05-12 · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · 3c6f5e4a-8d0b-6abc-d9e2-4f7a6b8c9d0e
Detects process execution indicators associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign targeting TanStack npm packages and others such as mistralai and uipath reported on early May 2026.
The preinstall hook runs setup.mjs, which downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime.
Author: Pushkarev Dmitry
· 2020-06-28 (modified 2025-12-03) · logsource: product=windows service=applocker · 401e5d00-b944-11ea-8f9a-00163ecd60ae
Detects when AppLocker prevents the execution of an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App from running.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, FPT.EagleEye Team, Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng, Michael Haag, Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, @scythe_io
· 2018-04-06 (modified 2023-04-24) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.)
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-10-25 (modified 2022-08-08) · logsource: category=proxy · 4922a5dd-6743-4fc2-8e81-144374280997
Detects a flashplayer update from an unofficial location
Author: heyyanu
· 2026-03-26 · logsource: product=windows service=applocker · 557e3bd3-7f21-495d-8d50-7c8bdfb8041c
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
· 2020-05-02 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 60936b49-fca0-4f32-993d-7415edcf9a5d
A General detection for a new application in AppCompat. This indicates an application executing for the first time on an endpoint.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-11-23 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 678eb5f4-8597-4be6-8be7-905e4234b53a
Detects exploits that use CVE-2017-11882 to start EQNEDT32.EXE and other sub processes like mshta.exe
Author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
· 2023-01-31 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=macos category=process_creation · 69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68
Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could indicates malicious macro execution