Techniques › T1668
T1668 Exclusive Control
persistence — Linux, macOS, Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON
1
MITRE detection strategy
3
analytics
0
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1668
0
KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries who successfully compromise a system may attempt to maintain persistence by “closing the door” behind them – in other words, by preventing other threat actors from initially accessing or maintaining a foothold on the same system.</p><p>For example, adversaries may patch a vulnerable, compromised system to prevent other threat actors from leveraging that vulnerability in the future. They may “close the door” in other ways, such as disabling vulnerable services, stripping privileges from accounts, or removing other malware already on the compromised device.</p><p>Hindering other threat actors may allow an adversary to maintain sole access to a compromised system or network. This prevents the threat actor from needing to compete with or even being removed themselves by other threat actors. It also reduces the “noise” in the environment, lowering the possibility of being caught and evicted by defenders. Finally, in the case of Resource Hijacking, leveraging a compromised device’s full power allows the threat actor to maximize profit.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0015 Detection Strategy for Exclusive Control v1.0
AN0045 WindowsDetects unusual command executions and service modifications that indicate self-patching or disabling of vulnerable services post-compromise. Defenders should monitor for service stop commands, suspicious process termination, and execution of binaries or scripts aligned with known patching or service management tools outside of expected admin contexts.Tunable:
ServiceListTimeWindowAN0046 LinuxDetects adversary attempts to monopolize control of compromised systems by issuing service stop commands, unloading vulnerable modules, or forcefully killing competing processes. Defenders should monitor audit logs and syslog for administrative utilities (systemctl, service, kill) being invoked outside of normal change management.auditd:SYSCALLexecve: Commands like systemctl stop <service>, service <service> stop, or kill -9 <pid>→ DC0064 Command Executionlinux:syslogUnexpected termination of daemons or critical services not aligned with admin change tickets→ DC0033 Process TerminationTunable:CriticalProcessListAdminUserContextAN0047 macOSDetects unauthorized termination of system daemons or commands issued through launchctl or kill to stop competing services or malware processes. Defenders should monitor unified logs and EDR telemetry for unusual service modifications or terminations.macos:unifiedloglaunchctl unload, kill, or pkill commands affecting daemons or background services→ DC0064 Command Executionmacos:osqueryprocess_termination: Unexpected termination of processes tied to vulnerable or high-value services→ DC0033 Process TerminationTunable:ProtectedServiceList
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1668
No Sigma rule carries this tag. MITRE publishes a detection strategy above, so the behaviour is specified; what is missing is public detection content.