Techniques › T1599
T1599 Network Boundary Bridging
defense impairment — Network Devices · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1599
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.</p><p>Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.</p><p>When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via Multi-hop Proxy or exfiltration of data via Traffic Duplication. Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with Internal Proxy to achieve the same goals. In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0006 Detection Strategy for Network Boundary Bridging v1.0
AN0015 Network DevicesFrom a defender’s perspective, suspicious bridging is observed when network devices begin allowing traffic that contradicts existing segmentation or access policies. Observable behaviors include sudden modifications to ACLs or firewall rules, unusual cross-boundary traffic flows (e.g., east-west communications across separated VLANs), or simultaneous ingress/egress anomalies. Multi-event correlation is key: configuration changes on a router/firewall followed by unexpected traffic patterns, especially from unusual sources, is a strong indicator of compromise.NSM:Flow
Unexpected flows between segmented networks or prohibited ports→ DC0078 Network Traffic Flownetworkdevice:syslogACL/Firewall rule modification or new route injection→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentTunable:TimeWindowApprovedChangeListGeoLocationTrafficVolumeThreshold
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1599
No Sigma rule carries this tag. MITRE publishes a detection strategy above, so the behaviour is specified; what is missing is public detection content.
Sub-techniques
| ID | Name | Sigma rules | KEV CVEs |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1599.001 | Network Address Translation Traversal | 1 | 0 |