kevmap

TechniquesT1176.002 › AN1549

AN1549 Analytic 1549

Linux · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2

<p>Adversary installs or abuses IDE extensions via CLI or direct write to profile directories and then communicates with marketplaces or remote tunnel services. Chain: auditd execve (code/idea/eclipse) with install/update flags or writes under ~/.vscode/extensions, ~/.config/JetBrains → outbound flows to .visualstudio.com, marketplace.visualstudio.com, .jetbrains.com, githubusercontent.com, or SSH/WebSocket tunnel endpoints → optional ssh/node processes spawned by IDE.</p>
Detects
T1176.002 IDE Extensions
Part of
DET0561 Detect malicious IDE extension install/usage and IDE tunneling

Log sources and channels

Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.

Log sourceChannelData component
auditd:SYSCALLexecveDC0032 Process Creation
auditd:SYSCALLopen,creat,rename,writeDC0039 File Creation
NSM:FlowConnections from IDE hosts to marketplace/tunnel domainsDC0078 Network Traffic Flow

Mutable elements

Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.

FieldDescription
IDEPathsPer-distro/profile extension directories differ; tune for Chromium/JetBrains snap/flatpak paths.
DomainAllowlistEnterprise-approved repos and proxies to reduce FPs.
UserRoleScopeLimit to non-developer users or production servers.
TimeWindowJoin horizon across file, process, and network telemetry.