Techniques › T1014 › AN1063
AN1063 Analytic 1063
macOS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Execution of unsigned kernel extensions (KEXTs), tampering with LaunchDaemons, or userspace hooks into system libraries.</p>
- Detects
- T1014 Rootkit
- Part of
- DET0377 Detection of Kernel/User-Level Rootkit Behavior Across Platforms
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| macos:unifiedlog | subsystem=com.apple.kextd | DC0016 Module Load |
| macos:osquery | launch_daemons | DC0060 Service Creation |
| fs:fsevents | Extensions | DC0061 File Modification |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
KextSignatureStatus | Allowable level of unsigned/3rd-party kernel extensions varies by organization. |
KextLoadOrigin | Detect whether the extension was loaded by an untrusted process or non-root user. |
AnomalousLaunchAgent | Detection tuned based on deviation from known/approved LaunchDaemon plist files. |