Techniques › T1578.004 › AN0953
AN0953 Analytic 0953
IaaS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Defenders can detect suspicious reversion of cloud compute instances by monitoring for unusual snapshot restores, rollback actions, or ephemeral storage resets that occur outside expected administrative workflows. From a defender’s perspective, relevant detection chains include: a snapshot restore triggered by a new or rarely used account, a sequence of snapshot creation immediately followed by a restore and instance start, or rollbacks performed from anomalous geographic or network locations. These patterns may indicate attempts to remove forensic evidence or re-establish a clean execution state for persistence.</p>
- Detects
- T1578.004 Revert Cloud Instance
- Part of
- DET0337 Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Revert Cloud Instance
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| AWS:CloudTrail | RevertSnapshot | DC0073 Instance Modification |
| AWS:CloudTrail | StartInstances | DC0080 Instance Start |
| AWS:CloudTrail | StopInstances | DC0089 Instance Stop |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
UserContext | Identity of the user or service account performing rollback actions; tuned to exclude automation or approved workflows. |
TimeWindow | Threshold for correlating snapshot creation followed by reversion within minutes; tuned to environment activity norms. |
GeoLocation | Region or source IP where the revert request originated; tuned to align with enterprise cloud geography. |
ChangeTags | Use of administrative tags or headers to distinguish legitimate restores from malicious activity. |