Techniques › T1567.003 › AN0787
AN0787 Analytic 0787
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Unexpected processes (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe, office apps) initiating HTTP POST/PUT requests to text storage domains like pastebin.com or hastebin.com, particularly when preceded by file access in sensitive directories. Defender perspective: correlation of process lineage, large clipboard/file read operations, and outbound uploads to text storage services.</p>
- Detects
- T1567.003 Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
- Part of
- DET0284 Detection Strategy for Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656 | DC0055 File Access |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=3, 22 | DC0082 Network Connection Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
TextStorageDomains | Domains to monitor such as pastebin.com, hastebin.com, ghostbin.com. |
UploadSizeThreshold | Minimum data size (e.g., >500KB) to trigger alerts for suspicious uploads. |
UserContext | User accounts with legitimate business justification for posting to text storage sites. |