Techniques › T1055.002 › AN0297
AN0297 Analytic 0297
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detects PE injection through a behavioral sequence where one process opens (OpenProcess) a handle to another, allocates remote memory (VirtualAllocEx), writes a PE header (MZ) or shellcode (WriteProcessMemory), then initiates a new thread (CreateRemoteThread or NtCreateThreadEx) in that process—executing injected code in memory without touching disk. Optional: injects a trampoline or shellcode that unpacks/reflectively maps the payload.</p>
- Detects
- T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection
- Part of
- DET0106 Behavioral Detection of PE Injection via Remote Memory Mapping
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=10 | DC0035 Process Access |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=8 | DC0020 Process Modification |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 | DC0039 File Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
PayloadEntropyThreshold | Controls for detecting high-entropy memory writes indicating shellcode or encrypted PE |
TargetProcessList | High-value or sensitive processes that should never have remote threads injected |
TimeWindow | Max allowed delay between memory write and thread execution |
ParentProcessAnomalyThreshold | Used to filter legitimate process hierarchies vs anomalous injection sources |