Techniques › T1505.004 › AN0184
AN0184 Analytic 0184
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Adversary installs or modifies IIS components (ISAPI filters, extensions, or modules) using DLL files registered via configuration changes or administrative tools like AppCmd.exe. These components intercept or manipulate HTTP requests/responses for persistence or C2.</p>
- Detects
- T1505.004 IIS Components
- Part of
- DET0068 Detection Strategy for T1505.004 - Malicious IIS Components
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656 | DC0061 File Modification |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 | DC0039 File Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=7 | DC0016 Module Load |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:System | Changes to applicationhost.config or DLLs loaded by w3wp.exe | DC0038 Application Log Content |
| WinEventLog:Microsoft-IIS-Configuration | Module or ISAPI filter registration events | DC0065 Service Modification |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
TimeWindow | Adjustable time frame for detecting chained events (e.g., config change + module load) |
UserContext | Scope detection to specific users or roles allowed to modify IIS components |
WatchedPaths | Specific directories such as %windir%\System32\inetsrv\ for DLL monitoring |
DLLNameEntropyThreshold | Entropy or name patterns to flag suspicious DLLs registered as components |
ParentProcessName | Restrict to DLLs loaded by w3wp.exe or invoked via AppCmd.exe |