Techniques › T1036.001 › AN0090
AN0090 Analytic 0090
macOS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Binaries or applications executed with tampered or unverifiable code signatures. Often tied to Gatekeeper bypasses, App Translocation, or use of unsigned launch daemons by untrusted users.</p>
- Detects
- T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature
- Part of
- DET0031 Invalid Code Signature Execution Detection via Metadata and Behavioral Context
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| macos:unifiedlog | subsystem:syspolicyd | DC0059 File Metadata |
| macos:endpointsecurity | ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC | DC0032 Process Creation |
| fs:fileevents | /var/log/install.log | DC0061 File Modification |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
CodeSigningStatus | Filters such as 'Unsigned', 'NotTrusted', or 'ModifiedSinceSigning' may vary by policy enforcement level |
UserContext | Tune whether detection applies to all users or excludes trusted admin accounts |
ExecutablePathPrefix | Enable tuning for known valid locations (e.g., /Applications) vs. suspicious paths (/Users/Shared) |